Abstract. By coining the term "unreliable narrator" Wayne Booth hypothesized another agent in his model besides the author, the implicit author, to explain the double coding of narratives where a distorted view of reality and the exposure of this distortion are presented simultaneously. The article deals with the applicability of the concept in visual narratives. Since narratives, it works through subjective mediators. According to scholarly literature on the subject, the narrator has to be strongly characterized, or is that the narrator is either missing or the narration cannot be attributed entirely to them. There is a medial rupture where the apparatus mediates the story instead of a character's oral or written discourse. The present paper focuses on some important but overlooked questions about the nature of Alfred Hitchcock's Stage Fright. Can a character-narrator control the images an anthropomorphic narrator? How useful is the term focalization when we
But more importantly, it raises some basic questions about cinematic storytelling and the nature of character narrators. 2 In this movie, Johnny, a character narrator is not just distorting the truth, but he is downright telling a lie for his own interest. With the analysis of this lying narrative I hope to shed some light on the concept of narrator and mediation through certain (often misunderstood) features of cinematic storytelling. The problem is quite complex because although one wishes to come up with a universal theory of the narrative, still one cannot mechanically utilize models of character narration and unreliability which are mainly deduced from verbal or literary discourses in classical narratology. But another great temptation for scholars when dealing with cases like the present one is to over-concentrate on the differences and ignore some serious similarities between literary and cinematic narration that can be found on a more abstract level. Hence, this paper attempts to focus on the formal, synthetic aspects of the problem. I would like to demonstrate that character narrators can still be considered as narrators and have as much power as any literary narrator over the discourse in spite of the asymmetry of the non-anthropomorphic framing
The movie begins with the scene of a woman and a man (Eve and Johnny) in happened, why he is trying to escape the law. The man starts to tell the story in which he got into trouble because of his lover, the famous actress, Charlotte Ingwood, who asked for his help in a murder. "I was in my kitchen, it was about Johnny, while images corroborating this verbal narration begin to appear in the movie. Here the viewer witnesses all the indicators of a typical technique of the standing in the door in a bloodstained dress and asking him to fetch her a clean one from her apartment, where she killed her violent husband. Complying with Charlotte's request, we see Johnny entering the apartment, discovering the dead sequence turns out to be a lie regarding the central plot element. In the last scene of the movie, Johnny confesses the murder to Eve. It was him, not his mistress 2 The whole reasoning of the present paper, especially observations concerning the narrator, are inspired by the principles articulated in Richard Walsh's paper Who is the Narrator? (1997) The question on which opinions are most divided is the attribution of this unreliability. Who is responsible for the lie in narratological terms: the character of Johnny or the non-anthropomorphic cinematic narrator? Can a character narrator control the images we see? Where can we localize the source of this unreliability and why is this important? Or simply put, the underlying question is about the workings of cinematic unreliability, its differences from literary models and theories, and the question whether these differences can be derived from medial features only. Can we attribute unreliability to a non-anthropomorphic and non-characterized narrator? At this point, to clarify my stance on the subject, mechanism, "the combination of cinematography, editing, mise en scène, and made into a persona, and it cannot arise from a character within the diegesis" (Anderson 2010, 83) . The present argument intends to challenge this latter part of the quotation and dispute that a character can possess narratorial qualities if the aforementioned combination of elements are understood as rhetorical acts.
Who Is in Charge? (The Issue of Narrative Power)
First, it is to be discussed how theorists tried to answer these questions and what presuppositions can be diagnosed in their opinions. Basically, there are two approaches regarding the source of deception. One of these states that Johnny's Chatman, not "the camera narrates the false sequence on its own. Rather, everything that we see and hear follows Johnny's scenario. Thus, even when his voice-over falls silent, he remains the controlling, if unreliable, narrator of the produces' the segment in any narratologically meaningful sense of that word, since every cinematic tool -editing, lighting, commentative music -works to actualize his lie. During these scenes, Johnny prevails responsible' for the lying images and sounds that we see and hear" (Chatman 1990, 132, my emphasis) .
In her 1989 book, Flashbacks in Film, Maureen Turim basically states the same: truthful to Johnny's narration" (Turim 1989, 166, my emphasis) . But there is an important difference here, since the keyword being truthful, and not produces, prevails or responsible. Therefore, she is a bit more nuanced in her opinion and concludes that: conforming means of expression to the interwoven fabric of Johnny's subjective account, and, in Robert Burgoyne builds on the concept of "impersonal narration," borrowed from Marie-Laure Ryan, and says that a narrator without personality "cannot lie cause the spectator to make incorrect inferences" (Ryan 1990, 7) . Clearly, this is
The Beautiful Mind (Ron Howard 2001) or The Sixth Sense (M. Night Shyamalan 1999), where the narration does not misreport events but simply underreports them. The implication for him is that "lying narration in (Ryan 1990, 7) . Burgoyne argues that the wide range of cinematic resources are not reserved exclusively for the impersonal narrator. "The unreliable character narrator can utilize images as well as words, as seen in Stage Fright" (Burgoyne 1990 , 7) -he claims.
On the other end of the theoretical spectrum, researchers tend to think that cinematic narration has a greater role in deception. David Bordwell states about narration shows itself to be duplicitous by neglecting to suggest any inadequacies in Johnnie's account and by appearing to be highly communicative -not just reporting what the liar said but showing it as if it were indeed objectively true" (Bordwell 1985, 61, my emphasis) . Hence the narrative is not mysterious, but deceptive. Bordwell undoubtedly touched upon something important here: even Chatman agrees that "the camera collaborates with, subserves the narrator by emphasis) or as it were, it duplicates the rhetorical act of the diegetic narrator they do not produce" (Branigan 1985, 61) .
Gregory Currie goes even further in his argument against Chatman's view: "Johnny, like the other characters, exists within the story, and it is no part of that story that he produced and edited cinematic images in order to convince his (and us?) of his innocence -anyway a transparently self-defeating enterprise" (Currie 1995, 27, my emphasis). In accordance with Currie, Anderson character's point of view, but would never assume that the character had actually put the clip together." And she argues that it is "the narrator, who alone can present events to the viewer" (Anderson 2010, 85) , and characters cannot be cinematic narrators because "theirs may be the points of view to which we are privy, but they cannot communicate to us. They may see, but it is the cinematic narrator who speaks, as it were, who presents" (Anderson 2010, 88) .
Aspects of Mediation (the Issue of Technicality)
but they realize them as well. They are not "pretended assertions" as Searle calls them in a revision of speech-act theory (Searle 1975, 324) , but they create a communicational situation between author and audience. My main focus is on the elements indispensable for the act of mediation due to their certain qualities. I want to draw a basically dual conceptual distinction based on the italicized expression and examine the ideas this expression refers to.
Because theorists failed to differentiate between the rhetorical and the technical aspects of mediation (which is one of the most important functions in narration), they are struggling with inappropriate questions like how a character can edit a sequence. The discrimination sketched in the following is a line between the abstract activities of semiotic articulation (rhetorical level) and the tools of conceptual and physical realization (technical level).
Many of the expressions used to describe the activities of the narration (like: produce, actualize, show, edit, put the clip together) are inappropriate terms in their context for analyzing the operation of the agents of mediation. They only make sense when they are referring to the physical activities of real-world entities or processes, like the actions of the makers or the performance of technological equipment. They can be used in narratological analysis, but only with increased awareness, often metaphorically. The coding and materiality of the narrative has nothing to do with the diegesis, nor with the communication between author and recipient, which process still belongs to the rhetorical level. , what we perceive in the representation as a textual form seems just slightly different and easily reconvertible in our minds. The technique is conventionalized to a degree that the shift is inconspicuous and seldom detected because the readers are much accustomed to it. obvious, more evident, the technical side being more dominant. At least in duality between the "mediating function of consciousness" (Fludernik 1996, 36) and material mediation. When one speaks about the activities of the cinematic narrator, one still thinks of an abstract entity, an organizing principle which can do the editing and the adding of a soundtrack not because of the physical apparatus available to him, but because it performs symbolic acts, it is primarily sense-making, cognitive construction, and not the bricolage of an artefact. Even if the character cannot "actually put the clip together," this does not make them less capable on the rhetorical level to be a narrator in a story; so these are bad arguments against the narratorial qualities of character narrators because they that, because of some evident mimetic traditions of the genre, the characters do not have the ability to literally mediate audiovisuals, only the cinematic narrator is capable of performing this. But even when one tries to describe the activity of this agent, one shouldn't confuse its abstract function with the actual, physical realization of the work. a character narrator, I consider the agent making each level "cinematic" (instead of separate cinematic narrators) more like the same authorial force, supplementing the characters' narrations. What makes these narratives "cinematic" are the tools the author uses as rhetorical resources to present someone's story directly or indirectly.
narration, who (both as teller and protagonist of the story) is incapable of communicating with images. The framing (cinematic) narration quotes the character narrator directly only in the transition from one narrative level to another (the simultaneous application of verbal and visual narration is the marker of this transition), then represents his utterance by means of its own medial resources. The author had the opportunity to show the act of lying mimetically, without images, hence it is a rhetorical choice in itself to reduplicate the character's own rhetorical act: lying. It means that the lie (with the aim of deceiving the communication partner about the truthfulness of certain events) functions in two different levels at the same time. In the diegesis, the object of the persuasion is another character, Eve, who only hears the story and is fooled because of her audience who believe the lie for substantially different reasons.
can rhetorically put the clip together (notice that we are still at a metaphorical level here) but not without the tools needed for the realization of the artwork. It would be a mistake to forget that this is another sense of the word mediation, associated with the materials that cater this function and closely related to the medium. Even though it is only connected to narrative consciousness or agency as raw material, technical mediation is frequently blurred with rhetorical devices in narrative analysis.
The Code (the Issue of Materiality)
Let us turn our attention to this element often transparent in literature, but quite concern is a very fundamental one. The material dimension which provides the instruments for narrative communication is often confused with an element which is only partly material: an essential aspect of mediation called code by Roman Jakobson and W. J. T. Mitchell. The latter wrote about the origins of the concept supposedly already present in Aristotle's Poetics: "Aristotle says that representations differ from one another in three ways: in object, manner, and forms, paint" (Mitchell 1995, 13) . But Mitchell is not very precise when he makes an equation between these two terms. Code has a more subtle meaning; to use is slightly misleading to use the two concepts as synonyms because code is a lot more abstract than the material that is used for creating a representation. It is not a physical-material object but a conceptual entity which is called the sign vehicle by Saussure. It is an abstract system rather than a sensual, palpable, visible or audible material manifestation. Nonetheless, the artefacts constructed out of these systems must take on a material form, that is, they must gain some sort of physical presence as they become artistic or simply communicational utterances.
The two aspects of mediation that has been distinguished previously could be understood as answers to the questions: "who mediates?" and "what mediates?" Narrative representation consists of the co-operation of these two, practically inseparable sides: on the one hand the activity of abstract agents linked to the rhetorical side (character narrator, cinematic narrator), on the other hand the conceptual tools (the code of the medium) and their material realization (the artefact) are both essential for the narrative to be established.
would be pointless either to assign him as a sense-making agent to the mediating capacities of the code or to equate the narrator with this aspect of the code. The narrator is not even the agent who facilitates the tangible realization of the code because it is a discursive concept, not an actor of the real world. This is the reason why it would be wrong to hold a character narrator in a movie accountable for this any narrato-logically meaningful sense of that word, since every cinematic tool -editing, lighting, commentative music -works to actualize his lie" (Chatman 1990, 132) . When Currie argues that Johnny could not be the real narrator of the lying sequence because he, "like the other characters, exists within the story, and it is no part of that story that he produced and edited cinematic images in order
Two Assumptions about Cinematic Character Narrators
Johnny is a character narrator whose natural discourse is presented to the viewer cinematic narrator are important for the complexity of the sequence and the (1) the character is a fullat the same time on the discourse. supplement it with additional meaning because of the medial difference between the two narrations, and the capacity of cinema to simultaneously utilize multiple channels of communication to construct its narrative.
Proving the First Assumption
because they cannot utilize audiovisuality in the way cinematic narration does. Is Johnny really a narrator in this movie, even if cinematic codes were superimposed narration is a representation and every embedded narration is also a representation of narration. Two different kinds of codes operate, and the discursive textual one superimposes on the thematic, verbal one. One should not forget that narrators are able to mediate their stories not because they are literally in possession of the tools that can produce the perceivable material codes or physical form of a representation, but because of a rhetorical act from the (implicit) author.
Johnny is an embedded narrator, situated inside the diegesis, and that is why "only a character," ontologically inferior to the cinematic discourse and thus not capable of editing, showing images or producing sound. The problem is not with his potentials as a storyteller but with his position. That is why I hypothesize a model where narrators like him cannot accost us directly; hence their lie would remain only a diegetic one, while the framing cinematic narration is transforming it (by performing a rhetorical act) to sound and images. And as a rhetorical act, the narration of the primary visual diegesis could still do this transformation if there is directly addressing his extradiegetic narratee (who is the closest thing to the similarity is exactly the point of the rhetorical act behind the narrator's action) and could create a more absurd scenario like in Fight Club (David Fincher, 1999) or American Beauty (Sam Mendes, 1999 
Proving the Second Assumption
It is best to focus on the above mentioned two assumptions, that both the character and the cinematic narration have their own rhetorical function, on character narrated sequences like my main example, with a strange surplus (in the rhetorical level) that cannot be attributed to the narrating character as an anthropomorphic entity inside the diegesis, should still be considered as an utterance of the character, but presented by a different medium, which is not surplus I am mostly referring to the audiovisual dimension, whose presence and narratorial activity in its own cinematic means. As it has been registered earlier, the cinematic narration duplicates the character's gesture of deception, therefore even if they are not aware of the audience and cannot manipulate the visuals, rhetorically meaningful element to the character narrator, even if it is certainly not the case the best example to illustrate the possible hierarchies between human and non anthropomorphic cinematic narrators because of its complex narrative situation: what most critics tend to neglect is that we are talking about an embedded narration and more than one diegetic level. For this reason, it is indeed necessary to pay attention to elements with a different rhetorical purpose from that of the character narrator. Chatman misunderstood the situation when he stated that there were two equal narrative instances in Stage Fright, Johnny and the cinematic narrator, and also when he used the movie to demonstrate that "it is the implied which is true" (Chatman 1990, 132) . Chatman treats the scope and function of implied authors differently than the present paper. In Stage Fright, the cinematic narration inevitably frames the character's account, whose narration is always embedded as long as one postulates a non-anthropomorphic agency controlling narrator's and the implied author's scope, function or power. Cinematic narration in the widest sense (the combined application of cinematic resources: as the apparatus, the choice of actors, the mise en scène, etc. which of course are not purely narrative but they are in the service of storytelling) is considered to be equivalent with the implied author's rhetorical activity.
Turim, in her book Flashbacks in Film (1989) , explores the characteristics of deceive the viewer. Although she does not say it explicitly, some of her arguments highlight the role of cinematic narration in the lie and it helps to prove its function
The movie greatly relies on the mimetically motivated tradition that characters can lie verbally, but the images we see are objective and represent the truth. This
In other words, the big twist was based on the subversion of a cinematic code, which Johnny was certainly unaware of. In Turim's view, the function of the the police, which actually turns out to be true, is to lay stress on the reliability of the thoughts and personality (in psychological, not ethical terms) of the character, so the more the viewers know what he really experienced, the less they will doubt the accuracy of his evocation of events. The joke in this narration is that the between the two. The juxtaposition of imagination and memory with realistic visuals opposed to a kind of palimpsest images is undeniably an important factor that is outside Johnny's control.
According to Turim, because Johnny evokes events that took place in the theatre "his version is authenticated by her acceptance of the retelling" (Turim 1989, 167) . This argument should be reconsidered. She states that the theatre scene is supposed to convince Eve about earlier events, to "paint the full picture" for her, but it is not a satisfying answer in every aspect. Johnny is telling a sequence of events to her of which she has already been a witness. Thus, the scene is highly between the two characters. Although it is perfectly sensible and functional in key element in the plot, namely, how Johnny escaped from the immediate danger. It is a brief but meaningful digression showing us a rhetorical gesture in which the story of the character narrator is not supplemented by additional details but it exists for higher communicational purposes.
Focalization
almost always the explicit focalizer. If we take Johnny Cooper as an example, we would say that he relates his version of events to Eve Gill, while the cinematic narrator focalizes through him, presenting to the viewer what Johnny describes to Eve" (Anderson 2010, 89) . Mentioning the term focalization is not a new development in this case, Turim has already used it in her book, saying "this by an omniscient narration, but rather by a single character. The audience is led of how focalization can be used as a crucial element of narrative" (Turim 1989, 165) . Turim basically states that there is deceptive internal focalization where the subjective nature of the story is hidden by the objectively looking cinematic narration which focalizes the main character. Once the truth is spilled out, the
In my interpretation, just the opposite is true: the seemingly internally focalized sequence turns out to be in no correlation with the diegetic truth, and because of this, I want to challenge the application of this narratological term elaborated by Gérard Genette for the relationship between a narrator and a character, and not for that between two narrating instances or embedment. Genette introduces the term in order to avoid "a confusion between the question who is the character whose point of view orients the narrative perspective? and the very different question who is the narrator -or, more simply, the question who sees? and the question who speaks? between sight (perception) and speech (the utterance of the narrator), as cinema basically tells through showing. 4 4 on. My argument is entirely compatible with André Gaudreault's famous distinction between monstration and narration. In his essay, Narration and Monstration in Film he describes cinema as a medium utilizing two representational devices. The activity of monstration can be understood as the production of a micro-narrative within a single shot, the semiotic articulation between the frames that is always in a state of here and now, it is the illusion of presence and happens between shots and overwrites this illusion with the fragmentation of space-time. Nevertheless, it cannot function independently of monstration because "there is no possibility of opening a temporal gap, a breach within which the narrating instance could allow itself to multiple modes of representing subjectivity with different amounts of information: think about the difference of subjective camera ("point-of-view shot") and "over the shoulder shot," which is more like the vision of a third person. This visual get a subjective account of events: we follow Johnny and functionally know as much as his character in the second degree narrative, while the objective camera establishes a certain sense of reliability, implying we are outside Johnny's subjective perception. The question is whether it is rhetorically meaningful if the viewer literally sees more or different things than Johnny? In Stage Fright, the relevant tool is not the difference between Johnny's and the audience's vision, but a more fundamental one: the choice of showing Johnny's lie in audiovisual terms.
It is the view of the present essay that in movies like Stage Fright or The Usual Suspects (Bryan Singer, 1995) (with another embedded lying narrator) cinematic narration is not focalizing the character narrator because it turns out that the presented scenes are not simply the character's viewpoint, subjective perception of the world, or experiences of the past. At one point, the viewer realizes that she saw cannot be considered as a distortion or restriction of information (Genette 1980, 189) in the Genettian sense, but an extension of the diegesis: as another narrative because those who interpret Johnny as a focalized object (in Bal's terms 5 ) may miss to make sense only if applied to the relation between the character narrator (situated in the embedding level) and himself as the embedded character. 6 Regarding the lying Johnny, the cinematic narration of Stage Fright does not utilize him only as a character but as another narratorial instance. That his voice is literally muted and 5 Bal sees focalization as a dichotomic, subject-object relationship. There is always an agent, who is the focalizor, and a focalized object. The narration represents the object (it can be a story, a description, a characterization, basically every element of a text) as the focalizing subject perceives it (cf. Bal 2009, 107-119) . 6
One could see the concept of focalization as a redundancy when used for narrators in any kind of autodiegesis. According to Genette, this type of narration should be called "prefocalized" because the character narrator (as a character of the discourse) is obliged to justify how he gained the presented information; therefore, focalization is not a choice but a requirement because it "submits a priori to a modal restriction, one that can be sidestepped only by an infraction, or a perceptible distortion" (Genette 1988, 78) .
his story is represented in other ways may be an unusual technique, but it should not confuse our critical acumen. What is revealed in the sequence is not directly connected to his selfhood, personality, knowledge or memory but his agency as a mediator, his skills of intrigue. The cinematic narration does not represent or explore his perspective of the diegetic world he is living in but duplicating his rhetorical act, his intent of deception. Moreover, it is worth observing that most of the time the movie follows Eve's character: her knowledge is much closer to the viewer's knowledge vision of the story, thereby the viewer gets access to her imagination instead of Johnny's memories.
I did not talk about extreme cases of explicit contradictions in the story between the verbal and the visual channels (partly because there is no voice-over during interactions that utilize the medial differences of linguistic and cinematic signs. Here, the character narration and the activity of an outside agent did not become
